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Deference to Discretion: Scalia's Impact on Judicial
Review of Agency Action in an Era of
Deregulation
There are vast tides in human history: the Age of the Industrial
Revolution, the Age of Enlightenment. Ours will doubtless go down
as the Age of Deregulation in the history books of the future. It is a
trend that has been around for some time now ... and the process
raises some special problems of judicial review.I

With these comments, Antonin Scalia, then a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals, opened a panel discussion of the Forty-Fifth
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit on the topic "Judicial Review in an Era of Deregulation." The era of deregulation to
which Scalia referred began in the early 1970s. Deregulation 2 has
reached a high point during President Reagan's terms in office, keeping
with his Administration's goal of "getting the Federal Government off
the backs of the American people."' 3 While it is unlikely that the accomplishments of this era of deregulation will ever match the achievements
of the Industrial Revolution, Scalia is correct that deregulation raises, or
perhaps brings to light, problems for judicial review of administrative
4
action.
1. Statement by Scalia made at the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in an Era of Deregulation, 105 F.R.D. 321, 323
(1984).
2. "Deregulation" can be defined as "cutting back Federal controls." S. REP. No. 1018,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). For purposes of this Note, deregulation means the removal or
relaxation of administrative rules designed to implement regulatory legislation. The term subsumes rescission or elimination of rules, relaxation or replacement of existing rules with less
stringent rules, and inaction where regulatory legislation calls for action.
3. Remarks of the Vice Presidentat the Annual Republican Senate-House Dinner, 1981
PUB. PAPERS 336, 338, col. 2 (1981) [hereinafter Vice President'sRemarks].
4. Much of the deregulation is accomplished by administrative agencies through informal rulemaking proceedings. Use of informal rulemaking in place of adjudication has increased significantly since the mid-1960s. As Professor K.C. Davis stated in 1978, "[the new
emphasis on informal action, including rulemaking, has given rise to new problems that.., are
still largely open, including such vital questions as what procedures are appropriate for developing the factual component of rules and how courts should resolve factual issues in absence of
a transcript of evidence produced before an agency." 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1.6, at 16 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter K. DAVIS, TREATISE].
In addition to these practical problems of how the courts' review agency rulings, debate
continues over the fundamental role of the courts in the administrative process. Although the
courts have power to review agency decisions, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982), the traditional ap[1223]
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Scalia's appointment to the Supreme Court is likely to have a significant impact on the development of administrative law. 5 He has an extensive background in this area: he taught administrative law at the
University of Chicago, led the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association, and chaired the Administrative Conference of the
United States. As a judge, Scalia is reputedly more deferential to agency
policy-making choices than former Chief Justice Burger. 6 As a commen7
tator, he has long espoused both regulatory reform and deregulation.
In addition, Scalia has a reputation as "a charming conservative
with [the] ability to effect compromises. ' ' 8 As one colleague at the University of Chicago has stated, "He has the personal skills, intelligence,
patience and manner to work out compromises and find common ground
.... "9 Another commentator has remarked:
Scalia is renowned for his congenial and winsome personality.., and
is effective in forging coalitions in particular cases. These attributes,
combined with his cogent writing and intellectual strengths, suggest an
ability to persuade the centrist justices (White, Powell, and less frequently Harry A. Blackmun) to coalesce behind a more restrained or
conservative jurisprudence. 10
His persuasiveness, his ability to compromise, and his extensive background in the area of administrative law make certain that Scalia's voice
will carry great weight in future administrative law cases.
proach, reflected in the standard of review, requires that courts treat agency policy decisions
with great deference. See O'Reilly, JudicialReview of Agency Deregulation: Alternatives and
Problemsfor the Courts, 37 VAND. L. REV. 509, 517 (1984) ("The courts' deferential acceptance of policy decisions made by agencies is a widely accepted model ofjudicial review."). Yet
when an agency acts in an arbitrary fashion, contrary to congressional intent or without consideration of the factors Congress has determined the agency should consider, the courts must
step in and correct the deficiency. It is the possibility of arbitrary agency decisionmaking,
rather than properly exercised agency discretion, which creates problems in determining the
role of the courts in the administrative process.
5. Administrative law is the branch of law which controls the administrative agencies,
rather than the substantive law produced by the agencies themselves. "It sets forth the powers
which may be exercised by administrative agencies, lays down the principles governing the
exercise of those powers, and provides legal remedies to those aggrieved by administrative
action." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1 (1976).
6. See generally Fein, High Court UpheavalPresages ConservativeShift, Legal Times of
Washington, June 23, 1986, at 14, col. 3 [hereinafter Fein, High Court Upheaval] and cases
cited therein.
7. See generally Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules, REGULATION, July-Aug. 1981, at 25 [hereinafter Scalia, Back to Basics]; Scalia, Regulatory ReformThe Game Has Changed, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 13 [hereinafter Scalia, Regulatory
Reform]; Scalia, Vermont Yankee: the APA, the D.C Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. CT. REV. 345 (1979) [hereinafter Scalia, Vermont Yankee].
8. Marcotte, New Kid on the Block, 72 A.B.A. J. 20 (1986).
9. Id.; see also Adlev, Live Wire on the D.C. Circuit, Legal Times of Washington, June
23, 1986, at 9, col. 2 ("his aggressively argued, deeply conservative opinions have grabbed
attention and earned him a place as a leader of the court").
10. Fein, High Court Upheaval, supra note 6, at 14, col. 3.
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Scalia's overall philosophy reflects an attitude of judicial restraint
and a strong tendency to leave the ultimate resolution of issues regarding
the governmental balance of power to the political branches. He appears
to prefer a more restrictive view of standing than that adopted by the
Supreme Court in recent years. His cases dealing with the proper scope
of review of agency action are generally deferential, calling for a very
narrow construction of the prescribed standard of review.1"
Scalia has stated that "[r]ulemaking is a quasi-legislative activity...
[which] surely implies some element of what might be termed political
discretion, not reviewable by the courts." 12 As this Note will show,
Scalia would use his restrictive interpretation of the standing doctrine
and a narrow interpretation of the applicable scope of review to decrease
the judiciary's role in what he views as the fundamentally political arena
of agency decisionmaking.1 3 Thus, Scalia would protect political discretion by limiting access to the courts and by ensuring that agency decisions are treated with great deference when access is obtained. This
decreased judicial role would leave the agencies free to deregulate with14
out judicial scrutiny, a result which Scalia considers highly desirable.
This Note argues that adoption of Scalia's approach is not mandated by
either the doctrine of separation of powers nor the legislative history of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 15 and would result in a highly
undesirable abdication of judicial responsibility given the current deregulatory atmosphere.
This Note first discusses the APA provisions applicable to rulemaking and the background of the deregulatory movement. The Note then
analyzes Scalia's views in two areas of administrative law: standing to
secure review of agency action and the scope of review once a claimant
gains access to the federal courts.1 6 Finally, the Note considers the potential impact should the United States Supreme Court adopt Scalia's
approach in these areas.
11. The Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) arbitrary and capricious standard for
review of informal rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982), is discussed more fully infra at
notes 154-82 and accompanying text.
12. Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. v. (1982) [hereinafter Scalia,
Rulemaking].
13. See, eg., id.
14. See generally Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 7, at 13 (commenting that
Republicans in Congress seem unaware that "every curtailment of desirable agency discretion
obstructs ...departure from a Democratic-produced, pro-regulatory status quo.").
15. Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
16. Scalia's views will be analyzed in reference to the overall development of the law in
these areas rather than attempting to compare his views to those of individual justices on the
Supreme Court. Thus, the emphasis is on how Scalia would prefer to see the law developed,
rather than on predicting exactly how he would interact with individual justices.
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I. Agency Rulemaking and Regulation
A.

Provisions of the APA for Rulemaking and Adjudication

Administrative agencies are endowed with both legislative and judicial power: they have authority to issue rules and regulations 17 having
the force of law and to adjudicate individual cases. 18 An agency's legislative or rulemaking power is circumscribed by its enabling statute, which
sets forth the degree of authority Congress has delegated. "The legislature is vested with all the legislative authority granted by the Constitu17. A "rule" or "regulation" can be defined as "an agency statement of general applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the proccdure or practice requirements of an agency." Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 (1982).
The Supreme Court has upheld the power of agencies to engage in general rulemaking, as
opposed to adjudication governing only the parties before the agency, as early as 1915. See BiMetallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). The original text of the
APA permitted agency action in the form of informal as well as formal rulemaking and adjudication, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, but informal rulemaking was largely ignored in favor of the
other two methods until about the mid-1960s. See generally Scalia, Vermont Yankee, supra
note 7, at 375-78 and sources cited therein. In 1968, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a procedure by which the Federal Power Commission, unable to deal with the large
volume of rate-setting cases by adjudication, began to establish areawide rates. Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). See generally Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking
Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 n.2 (1974) [hereinafter
Wright, Limits of Judicial Review]. This assertion by agencies of their "long dormant
rulemaking powers," id. at 377, has accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s so that much of agency
action is now achieved through informal rulemaking. As Professor Davis stated in 1978,
"[the multiplication of rulemaking during the 1970s is in such volume that predictions that
rulemaking will become the mainstay for carrying out government programs are no longer
appropriate. Such predictions have already come true. Rulemaking is now the mainstay." K.
DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 4, § 1.9, at 34 (emphasis in original); see also Scalia, Back to
Basics, supra note 7, at 25 ("The 1970s have been aptly described by expert observers of the
federal administrative process as the 'era of rulemaking.' ").
18. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 3, at 6-7. The Supreme Court has upheld congressional conferral of jurisdiction on agencies to decide individual cases through adjudication,
despite the fact that the agencies are not article III courts. See Crowell v. Bensen, 285 U.S. 22
(1932). Congressional power to delegate legislative authority has been upheld, so long as the
delegation is limited by adequate standards. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742,
774-75, 778-79 (1948) ("A constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority
under it sufficient to effect its purpose."); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144-45
(1948) (upholding delegation because "[the standards prescribed pass muster under our decisions."); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (delegation would be unconstitutional only if "there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator's action,
so that it would be impossible... to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed").
But cf Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1935) ("The Congress manifestly
is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with
which it is thus vested."); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530
(1935) ("[T]he constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such [delegations] . ..
cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate."); see also Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936) (striking down delegation of authority to coal
producers and mine workers to determine maximum hours).
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tion; any power delegated by the legislature is necessarily a subordinate
power, limited by the terms of the delegating statute."' 19
The APA sets forth separate procedural guidelines for agency adjudications and for rulemaking. For rulemaking, "notice and comment"
proceedings are required. 20 General notice of proposed rulemaking must
be published in the Federal Register and must contain, among other
things, "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved."'2 ' The agency must provide
interested persons with "an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking

through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant
matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose."'22
"Notice and comment" procedures are generally designed to promote speed and efficiency in rulemaking, since they lack some of the procedural requirements necessary for adjudication or formal rulemaking.
Most significantly, the agency need not create an evidentiary record for
review by the courts under notice and comment procedures. The creation of such a record, however, is required in administrative adjudications and formal rulemaking proceedings. 23
Judicial review of agency action is most deferential in the rulemak19. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 4, at 8.
20. Section 553 of the APA provides for both formal and informal rulemaking. Formal
rulemaking is utilized when an enabling statute requires a rule to be made "on the record."
This requirement triggers the more formal, trial-like procedures of sections 556 and 557, normally applicable to adjudications. For example, under section 556, a party "is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for full and true disclosure of the facts." 5
U.S.C. § 556(d) (1982). No such procedures are required for informal rulemaking. The use of
the term "rulemaking" in subsequent discussion will refer to informal rulemaking, unless
otherwise indicated.
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Unless otherwise required by statute, notice is unnecessary
for interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice, or where "the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a
brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Id.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
23. From the mid-1960s through the early 1970s, the courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, attempted to impose so-called hybrid procedures on the agencies, similar to the procedures required for formal rulemaking and adjudication by APA section 554. See, e.g., Walter
Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1015-16 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (adjudicatory procedures
such as oral hearing and cross examination are required in some types of rulemaking proceedings). The Supreme Court struck down these hybrid procedures in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), holding that section
553's notice and comment procedures were the maximum procedural requirements Congress
was willing to impose on the agencies. While an agency is free to use additional procedures,
courts may not impose them on agency proceedings without a statutory mandate. Id. at 524.
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ing context. 24 Since rulemaking is a legislative function, the court does
not inquire into "the wisdom of the regulations" but rather inquires into
"the soundness of the reasoning by which the [agency] reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported. ' 25 The
exact amount of deference due an agency decision depends on the nature
of its enabling statute and the nature of the delegation of rulemaking
26
authority.
B. The Movement Toward Deregulation
Since 1968, informal rulemaking has become an important tool for
regulation by the agencies. Traditionally, regulation has been designed
primarily to control prices and entry of utilities, communications firms,
and transportation companies. 27 The number of federal regulatory agencies and the scope of regulatory activity, have vastly increased in recent
years. Between 1965 and 1975, twenty-six new agencies were created to
implement legislation involving workplace and product safety, health,
and environmental protection. 2 8 This increased regulation has been attributed to a "combination of prosperity, enthusiasm for social causes,
'2 9
optimism about government and concern about industrial side effects."
Regulatory reform has been a central goal of at least the past three
presidencies, in part as a response to the perceived costs of increased
regulation and resulting detrimental economic effects. 30 President Ford
Thus, unless the substantive statute governing a particular rulemaking contains an "on the
record" requirement, agencies need not create an evidentiary record.
There is much debate over the desirability of imposing an evidentiary record requirement
on rulemaking proceedings. The lack of such a record gives a reviewing court less information
about what factors the agency considered. Critics of the "on the record" requirement, however, argue against the delay and expense involved in creating such a record as opposed to
requiring the more simple and expedient notice and comment procedures. See, e.g., Wright,
Limits of JudicialReview, supra note 17, at 376 ("Trial-like adjudication is extremely costly in
time, staff and money.").
24. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 545-47 (1978); United States v. Florida East Coast Rwy. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 24445 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 749 (1972).
25. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. at 749.
26. Id. at 756-58.
27. S.BREYER, REGULATION AND nTs REFORM 1 (1982).
28. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982)); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431
(1982)); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (codified as amended in 15 & 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1982)); Consumer Product Safety Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
(1982)).
29. Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program:An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 129 (1980).
30. For example, Vice President Bush has commented that the first step of the Reagan
program must be "to free this economy from the shackles of unneeded bureaucratic regula-
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issued an executive order requiring that agencies write an "inflationary
impact statement" detailing how much proposed actions would raise
costs and whether there was a less costly alternative to deal with the
problem.3 1 President Carter undertook a quiet, yet extensive, economic
deregulation project but refrained from deregulation in the areas of
health, environmental, and other social concerns. 32 President Reagan's
deregulatory policy has been anything but quiet. Deregulation was a
principal part of his campaign platform in both 1980 and 1984. President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291,33 which authorizes direct participation and oversight by the Office of Management and Budget,
constitutes the most extensive executive intervention into the agency
34

decisionmaking process.
Criticisms of regulation typicially focus on cost, detrimental economic effect, ineffectiveness, and delay. 35 Critics also attack the lack of

tion." Vice President'sRemarks, supra note 3, at 338, col. 2. In the same speech, Vice President Bush also stated:
[W]e recognize the responsibility of government in protecting the environment...
[and] the safety of the workingplace. Of course we do. But unrealistic, overzealous
regulators have made a mockery of the good intentions, and by their arbitrary actions they've added tens of thousands of workers to the unemployment rolls ....
[S]mall businesses are being driven to their knees by the excesses of Federal regulation ....
Id.
31. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974), as amended by Exec. Order No.
11,949, 42 Fed. Reg. 1017 (1977); see S.BREYER, supra note 27, at 363.
32. O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 515-16.
33. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 (1982) [hereinafter Exec. Order 12,291].
34. One of the stated purposes of the order is to increase presidential oversight over the
regulatory process. It directs the agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed
regulatory action and to choose only the course of action which involves the least net cost to
society, taking into account the condition of particular industries affected, the national economy and future contemplated regulatory actions. It directs the agencies to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis of all major rules and requires that, before an agency promulgates a
major rule, it must send its proposal to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
analysis.
"Major rules" are defined sweepingly as regulation likely to result in (1) an annual effect
on the economy in excess of $100 million, (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers,
government agencies, individual industries, or geographic regions, or (3) significant adverse
effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, or innovation. The order thus
provides for OMB review and cost-benefit analysis of any rule which is likely to be the target of
Reagan's deregulatory policy. The executive order has been criticized on various constitutional and technical grounds. See generally, Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Exec. Power:
PresidentialControlof Agency Rulemaking UnderExec. Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV.193
(1981); Symposium: PresidentialIntervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV.
811 (1982).
35. Regulation has its biggest economic effect on private industry. Though regulatory
agencies used only one percent of the federal budget, census data indicates that federal environmental rules alone imposed direct costs of approximately $25 billion in 1979. Neustadt,
supra note 29, at 144. For a discussion of typical criticisms of regulation, see S.BREYER,
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comprehensive oversight of the regulatory process to ensure against overlapping, redundant, or unnecessary regulations. As one author states:
Apart from cost, the sheer mass and messiness of regulation has become a big problem. Too many rules are needlessly rigid, or are written in legal gobbledegook, or conflict with other rules. Too many
forms have to be filled out, and too many licenses and permits take
years to issue. Dozens of regulatory horror stories have undermined
the legitimacy of regulation as a means of settling policy
and have con36
tributed to the public's cynicism about government.
Regardless of its cause, this deregulatory movement creates some
special problems for the courts in reviewing the rulemaking proceedings
where much of the deregulation is accomplished. Without a rulemaking
record, 37 the courts are restricted in their efforts to review the deregulatory action to ensure its conformity with applicable law. Since deregulation often demands extensive departure from past practice, the courts
arguably need information about the rationale underlying the agency's
decision, which may not be contained in the simple "basis and purpose"
statement required for rulemaking proceedings.
In addition, the courts may be tempted to adopt a less deferential
stance towards the agency's decision to deregulate. Proponents of existing regulation typically challenge in the courts agency action that
threatens to lift or relax those regulations. Challenges to agency action
focus primarily on errors in agency reasoning. Challenges to deregulatory action, on the other hand, may focus on preservation of rules
under theories such as stare decisis or entitlement to the continued existence of the rule. These latter challenges focus more on the substance of
agency rulemaking than on the reasoning used in making a decision. As
one commentator has suggested, the pressure of these more substantive
challenges may have "shifted the courts'
sympathies from the agencies to
'38
the beneficiaries of endangered rules."
The next section analyzes Scalia's vievs on standing in light of the
Supreme Court's current test for standing under the APA.
II.

The Standing Doctrine

Standing to sue is the initial barrier which proponents of existing
supra note 27, at 2-4. Breyer cites studies which show that growth in regulated industries has
been slower since the advent of health, safety and environmental regulations when compared
to growth in unregulated industries. Id. at 2. In addition, he states that though "studies of
auto safety regulation credit federal regulation with a significant reduction in the number of
auto deaths, and the environment is clearly cleaner in some parts of the country, the extent to
which regulation can be credited with the improvement and whether its effect is worth its cost
are open to debate." Id.
36. Neustadt, supra note 29, at 144-45.
37. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
38. O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 509.
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rules must overcome to gain access to the courts to challenge agency
deregulation. The law of standing has been described as a "complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction. ' 39 It is based on the "case or controversy" clause of article III of the Constitution, 40 and places a limit on the
judicial power of the United States 4 ' consistent with the theory of separation of powers. As Justice Sutherland stated in Massachusetts v. Mellon,4 2 without proper standing, courts would intervene "not to decide a
judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which
'4 3
plainly [the court does] not possess."
The standing requirement has two objectives. 44 First, standing prevents use of the federal courts as a forum for airing generalized grievances about the conduct of government. Second, the doctrine ensures
that issues are specifically framed and actively contested so that challenges will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution. Thus, the federal courts have power to review a
governmental act only when a claimant has suffered or is threatened with
45
a direct, justiciable injury arising from that act.
Scalia views standing as an essential tool for protecting the political
judgments underlying an agency's promulgation of a rule. He believes
that "[t]he doctrine of standing ... was almost tailor-made to protect
political discretion." '4 6 As the following sections demonstrate, Scalia
would adopt a strict test for standing to achieve this end, rationalizing
the resulting limited access on majoritarian and separation of powers
grounds.
A.

Standing Under the APA

The judicial review provisions in section 702 of the APA extend a
right of judicial review to any person "suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute." 47 According to the executive branch
interpretation of the APA, while section 702 was meant to be a restatement of existing laws regarding standing, 48 Congress implicitly recog39.

United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).

40.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

41. Id.
42. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
43. Id. at 489.
44. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
45.

Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).

46. Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 12, at vi.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
48. United States Department of Justice, Attorney General'sManual on the Administrative ProcedureAct 96 (1947) [hereinafter Attorney General'sManual]; see also S. BREYER &
R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (2d ed. 1985) (Section 702
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nized the "continuing role of the courts" in determining who may seek
judicial review.4 9 The federal courts have not treated the APA as a
"static codification of standing law." Instead, they have modified the
doctrine to reflect current needs and perceptions.50
When Congress passed the APA in 1946, plaintiffs challenging
agency action in the federal courts were required to show the allegedly
'51
unlawful action had inflicted or threatened to inflict a "legal wrong.
Under the legal wrong test, a plaintiff with an actual injury might not
have standing to sue. The right invaded must have been a legal right"one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tor52
tious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."

In other words, to invoke judicial review, a plaintiff had to show that a

53
traditional "common-law right" had been invaded.
This requirement of a legal wrong was criticized as imposing "an
unnecessary impediment to judicial review."' 54 In Association of Data
ProcessingService Organizationsv. Camp,5 5 decided in 1970, the Supreme

Court abandoned the legal interest requirement for standing under the

APA. 5 6 The Court adopted a new test, requiring plaintiffs to show only

"is best understood as codifying the various bases for standing developed in previous judicial
decisions.").
49. Attorney General'sManual, supra note 48, at 96.
50. S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 48, at 1081.
51. The concept of "legal wrong" meant "such wrong as particular statutes and the
courts have recognized as constituting ground for judicial review." Attorney General'sManual,
supra note 48, at 96. A court could not decide a case unless "the nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties [were] such that
judicial determination [was] consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed." Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Section 702 was intended to preserve the rules developed by the Supreme Court in such
cases as Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938), and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923). Attorney General'sManual,supra note 48, at 96. In Massachusettsv. Mellon,
the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff must show not only that a statute is invalid "but that
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally." 262 U.S. at 488. The Ickes Court further clarified the concepts of "direct injury"
and "legal wrong": "[t]he term 'direct injury'

.. .

used in its legal sense ... [means] a wrong

which directly results in the violation of a legal right ....[W]here, although there is damage,
there is no violation of a right, no action can be maintained." 302 U.S. at 479.
52. Tennessee Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). For
example, in Tennessee Power, the Supreme Court held a claim of economic injury resulting
from competition by an allegedly unlawful government agency insufficient to establish standing because it did not violate a legal right.
53. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 177, 179
(1984).
54. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 8.15, at 468.
55. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
56. Id. at 153; see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers have
standing to challenge Department of Agriculture regulation because they had a personal stake
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that the challenged action caused "injury in fact," and that the alleged
injury was "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu57
lated" by the statute that the agency allegedly violated.
As currently construed by the Supreme Court, APA section 702
grants a statutory right of review 58 to any plaintiff who can establish all
and interest in the issue and were within the zone of interests protected by the Act). Barlow, a
companion case to Data ProcessingService, involved challenges to agency action, thus bringing
the plaintiffs within the purview of the APA's more liberal grant of standing. The "injury in
fact" test, however, has been extended to govern standing in nonagency cases as well. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Charles, 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986) (dismissing a physician's challenge to the constitutionality of a state abortion statute for lack of injury in fact).
57. DataProcessingSer., 397 U.S. at 152-53. Although the Court cited no precedent for
its injury in fact test, at least one commentator called for such a test prior to the Data Processing Service decision. Relying on statements in the legislative history of the APA, Professor
Davis argued that section 702 should be interpreted to provide for standing to those "adversely
affected in fact" or to those "'aggrieved ... within the meaning of any relevant statute.'"
Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental 4ction, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (1955)
(citing S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946)). This interpretation of section
702 has been criticized. See, e.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 48, at 1090 n.134
("There is no evidence that Congress contemplated such a change, or that it intended anything
more than a codification of preexisting judge-made standing law."); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court -. 4 Functional.4nalysis,86 HARV. L. Rv. 645, 659 (1973) (referring to the
support for Davis' theory as "bark" which is "altogether too frail for the load he would have it
carry.").
Thus, the "injury in fact" test was not an entirely new concept, since several states had
been using such a test for a long period prior to its adoption in Data ProcessingService. Professor Davis criticized Justice Frankfurter's characterization of standing as a "specialty of federal
jurisdiction" in United States ex rel. Chapman, see supra note 39 and accompanying text,
saying that it was true "[o]nly in one sense." According to Davis, states with independent tests
for standing adopted an "injury in fact" inquiry so the federal law of standing was a "specialty" only to the extent that it involved artificial concepts of "legal interest" which the state
courts had refused to adopt. Davis, supra note 57, § 1 at 354.
58. There are two types of cases for purposes of standing analysis-those involving statutory review (statutory cases) and those involving nonstatutory review (constitutional cases).
Statutory review can be defined technically as "review of an act or decision of a government
official or agency which Congress has expressly provided shall be subject to review in the
courts by some prescribed proceeding." Scott, supra note 57, at 647. Nonstatutory review is
review based on "some general jurisdictional grant or remedy not related to the specific governmental action or decision being challenged." Id. at 647-48.
Nonstatutory review subsumes all challenges to the constitutionality of a statute or of
government action when there is no express right of review. Standing in nonstatutory cases is
governed solely by judicially created rules. The typical challenge to agency action under APA
section 702 involves statutory review. With statutory review, Congress is free to modify these
judicially created rules, as long as it does not eliminate the standing requirement completely.
See infra note 61.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not always observed this distinction. See, e.g., S.
BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 48, at 1097 ("[IThe Supreme Court has sometimes
blurred the differences between the two types of cases and spoken as if the same standards
applied to both."). Thus, although the following discussion focuses primarily on statutory
review under the APA, some nonagency cases are included for purposes of clarifying the
standing doctrine.
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the elements of a bifurcated test for standing. This bifurcated test is essentially the Data Processing Service formula. The plaintiff's complaint
must be "arguably within the zone of interests" the challenged statute
protects or regulates.5 9 The test embellishes on the constitutional requirement of injury in fact: three elements must now be shown to satisfy
this requirement. First, the plaintiff must show injury in fact-that the
plaintiff personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. 6° Second, the
injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. 61 Third, the injury must be "likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." 62
The following sections look more closely at Scalia's interpretation of
each element of the standing inquiry and the rationale underlying his
approach.
59. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 (1976).
60. Id. at 38, 41.
61. Data ProcessingServ., 397 U.S. at 153; Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 n.19. For nonstatutory
cases, the general purposes of the standing doctrine have been incorporated into several socalled prudential considerations. If these prudential considerations indicate that the court
should not intervene, standing will be denied. The "zone of interests" requirement for standing under the APA is one such prudential consideration. There are at least two others which a
reviewing court undertaking nonstatutory analysis must consider. The plaintiff's claim must
not involve "'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized
grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative
branches." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)).
In addition, the" 'plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Id. at 474 (quoting
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
Ordinarily, application of these prudential considerations is mandatory and the reviewing
court must exercise its discretion to determine whether these limitations are present. Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 137 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Congress has power, however, to remove prudential barriers, creating
statutory standing for persons who would otherwise be barred from suit, although it may not
eliminate the essential constitutional requirement of injury in fact. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501
("Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing rules."); Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 (broadened access permitted but "[a] federal court cannot ignore the [injury in fact] requirement without overstepping its assigned role
in our system of adjudicating only actual cases and controversies.").
Section 702, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, constitutes a congressional
modification of the standing inquiry to eliminate the latter two prudential elements, leaving
only the zone of interests factor to augment the constitutional requirements. Although the
lower courts have applied a mixture of multi-pronged tests to the standing analysis, see generally, S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 48, at 1120-21 and cases cited therein, the injury
in fact-zone of interests formulation was recently upheld in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
62. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
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B. Scalia's Approach to the Standing Doctrine
(1) PreferredPosition: Statutory Review or a Legal Wrong
Apparently, as a first choice, Scalia favors return to the earlier legal
wrong 63 standard for acquiring access to the federal courts, unless a specific substantive statute makes statutory review available. Scalia has criticized the abandonment of the "legal wrong" requirement in the Data
Processing Service case and its companion, Barlow v. Collins.6 "An incorporation of existing liberalized standing provisions was transmogrified
into an affirmative grant of standing in 'all situations in which a party
who is in fact aggrieved seeks review, regardless of a lack of legal right or
specific statutory language.' "65
In addition, Scalia is critical of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 702 as a conferral of broad statutory standing. Instead, he
favors a narrower interpretation of section 702 that makes statutory review available only in certain instances. In Scalia's view, Data Processing
Service and Barlow eliminated the important distinction between statutory and nonstatutory review 66 which underlay the original intent of section 702.
These decisions read "adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute" to mean no more than "adversely affected or
aggrieved in a respect which the statute sought to prevent." In other
words, the courts converted the requirement of a statutory review provision into merely a requirement that the plaintiff be within the "zone
of interests" that the statute seeks to protect. 67
Under Scalia's preferred approach, if the substantive statute governing
particular agency action contains the "adversely affected" language or
something similar, statutory review would be available under a congressional grant of more generous standing and a broader class of plaintiffs
may sue. When the substantive statute does not contain a special review
provision, nonstatutory review would be a fallback position if plaintiffs
could meet the "traditional, more restrictive notions of 'legal wrong,'
through the use of common-law writs such as injunction and
63. Scalia would define a "legal" wrong as "a wrong already cognizable in the courtsthat is, one as to which standing already existed pursuant to traditional principles." Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK

U.L. REv. 881, 887 (1983) [hereinafter Scalia, Standing]. Absent an explicit provision for
statutory review, only those plaintiffs who could show that agency action caused injury to a

common law right-property, contract or tort-would gain access to federal court.
64. 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
cases which Scalia criticizes.
65. Scalia, Standing,supra note 63, at 889 (quoting Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
66.

Court.
67.

See supra note 58 for general discussion of the two types of review utilized by the

Scalia, Standing,supra note 63, at 889.
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mandamus."
This limitation, providing two means of establishing standing, is
consistent with Scalia's view of the primary purposes of the doctrine.
First, the doctrine is useful as a means of limiting access to the courts in
order to protect political discretion. 69 Scalia considers this discretion an
essential feature of agency rulemaking:
An agency may make some decisions in rulemaking not because they
are the best or the most intelligent, but because they are what the people seem to want ....
[This is] a good thing, too, unless you are
comfortable with the notion that the many agencies charged with pursuing goals no more specific than "the public interest, convenience and
necessity" are to do so in some isolated think-tank, without regard to
what the public wants .... ["What the public wants"] refer[s] not to
the latest Gallup poll, but to the manifestations of the popular will
through the politicalprocess-the administrationplaced in office in the
last election, the oversight and appropriationscommittees of Congress,
the groups with politicalpower... that appearbefore the agency and are
listened to more
closely than John Doe precisely because of their polit70
ical power.
Scalia would protect political discretion by limiting challengers' access to
the courts, thereby insulating agency decisions from judicial scrutiny to a
certain extent. This insulation would permit decision makers to take into
account more of the political factors that ordinarily accompany a legislative process such as rulemaking.
Second, in addition to protecting political discretion, the law of
standing furthers traditional separation of powers principles. It "roughly
restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes
them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other
two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority
itself."'7 1 Returning to the legal wrong test would serve this purpose by
confining nonstatutory access to those plaintiffs who can show that a
very individualized common law right has been invaded. Under Scalia's
interpretation of section 702, more generous statutory review is made
available by the representative branches in the specific instances where
the "adversely affected or aggrieved" language is incorporated into a substantive statute. In Scalia's view, increased access under a statutory right
is still consistent with a separation of powers analysis: the courts may
more readily intervene when Congress and the President allow it.
68. Id.
69. Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 12, at vi.
70. Id. at v.-vi. (emphasis added).
71. Scalia, Standing,supra note 63, at 894.
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(2) Interpretation of the Supreme Court's Test of Standing
Scalia has criticized the Supreme Court's bifurcation of prudential
and constitutional limitations on standing as "unsatisfying" because "it
leaves unexplained the Court's source of authority for simply granting or
denying standing as its prudence might dictate."' 72 Prudential considerations have no place in the analysis of standing because, rather than being
capable of exercising any discretion in the matter, "the Court must always hear the case of a litigant who asserts the violation of a legal
right."' 73 In addition, Scalia argues that the constitutional requirements
place no limit on the courts' power to confer broader standing because
"the courts have no such power to begin with." 74 Only Congress has
power to broaden standing and, absent an explicit and more liberal grant,
the only legitimate means for establishing standing is through assertion
of a legal wrong. 75 Notably, both these arguments advanced by Scalia
ignore the continuing judicial role in defining standing, which was im76
plicitly recognized in the APA's legislative history.
Despite his criticism of the Supreme Court's current test, Scalia was
faced with several cases requiring its application during his tenure on the
court of appeals. As developed below, Scalia's application of this test
comports with his generally restrictive view of the doctrine and its ultimate purpose of ensuring greater separation of powers.
a. Injury in Fact
It is easier to state the purpose of the injury in fact requirement than
to predict precisely when an alleged injury will be sufficient to meet a
reviewing court's standing inquiry. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 77 the actual injury requirement, like standing in general,
"tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the con' 78
sequences of judicial action."
Injury to an economic interest is not required under the injury in
fact inquiry; harm to a noneconomic interest will suffice. In Sierra Club
v. Morton,79 the Court stated that "[a]esthetic and environmental wellbeing, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality
72. Id. at 885.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 886 (emphasis in original).

75. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Id. at 472.
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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80
of life in our society."
The injury in fact test "requires more than an injury to a cognizable
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured. 8 1 Thus, in order to be an "adversely affected" party under
APA section 702, an organization like the Sierra Club must show more
than "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the
interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the
problem."8' 2 An abstract concern with the subject is not sufficient. The
group must show that its members will be adversely affected.8 3
That an injury is widely shared does not defeat a claim of standing.
As long as the harm is concrete and not merely a generalized grievance,
it suffices to show injury in fact. In Sierra Club, the petitioner challenged
a plan to build a ski resort in Mineral King valley, a national game refuge
in California. Although the Court ultimately denied standing because
the Sierra Club had not shown any of its members would be harmed,8 4
the Court stated that "the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process."'8 5
Similarly, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),8 6 the Supreme Court stated that to "deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others
are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody."' 87 In SCRAP, various environmental groups alleged 'economic, recreational and aesthetic'
harm from an agency rate structure they claimed would discourage the
use of recyclable materials, thus adversely affecting the environment.8 8
Though the "alleged injury to the environment [was] far less direct and
perceptible" than that alleged in Sierra Club,8 9 requiring the Court "to
follow a far more attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury,"
plaintiffs had alleged "a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished
them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that
were claimed to be affected." 90
Dissenting in Centerfor Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 734.
Id. at 734-35.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 740 n.15.
Id. at 734.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 675-76.
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at -688-89.
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Safety Administration (NHTSA),9 1 Scalia quoted language from a long
list of Supreme Court opinions in his attempt to define "injury in fact."
In order to satisfy article III standing requirements, Scalia would have
plaintiffs show an injury that is "'distinct and palpable,'... 'particular
[and] concrete,' ...'specific [and] objective,'. . . rather than 'conjectural
[or] hypothetical,' . . . 'remote [and] unsubstantiated by allegations of
fact,' ...'speculative' . ..or 'abstract' ... .-92 Where allegations are of
future injury, "the harm must be "'certainly impending"'. . . and 'real
and immediate.' -93

In Centerfor Auto Safety, the petitioners were four nonprofit consumer groups whose goal was to promote energy conservation. They
challenged an NHTSA order which amended previously published fuel
economy standards for light trucks to establish lower standards. The
petitioners alleged that this order gave impermissible weight to shifts in
consumer demand. 94 Thus, the order arguably violated a provision of
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA),95 which required that the agency designate standards at "the maximum feasible average fuel economy level."' 96 A majority on the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld standing for three of the organizations
because individual members would have had standing to sue in their own
97
right.

91. 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 1342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
93. Id. (citations omitted). Scalia used a similar long list of adjectives to define injury in
fact in United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir.
1984). That case involved a challenge to a Presidential order governing intelligence activities
of the executive branch. The appellants, political and religious organizations, and private individuals active in public affairs, alleged two injuries-the chilling effect on constitutionally protected activities that would result from fear of surveillance under the order, and the immediate
threat of being targeted for surveillance. They also claimed that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to permit discovery so appellants could allege more specific injuries. Id.
at 1377-78. Scalia denied standing because appellants had not alleged any specific threatened
or contemplated action against them. Although the nature of the plaintiffs' activities might
have made them more likely to be the subject of surveillance, the harm of chilling effect was
not sufficient to establish the "genuine threat" required for standing. Id. at 1380.
94. 793 F.2d at 1323-24.
95. Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 & 42 U.S.C.).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 2002(b) (1982).
97. 793 F.2d at 1329-30, 1338-39. The majority cited the Supreme Court opinion in
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 1333, 1343 (1977), for the
proposition that
an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.
793 F.2d at 1329 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 1343). Finding the second and third require-
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In his dissent, Scalia argued that the petitioners in Centerfor Auto
Safety had engaged in "nothing more than an 'ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable,' in which petitioners have merely 'imagine[d] circumstances in which [they] could be affected by the agency's action.' "98
He characterized petitioners' allegations of injury as "bald assertions that
unidentified members of their organizations may be unable to purchase
unidentified types of fuel-efficient light trucks or light-truck model options." 99 Scalia would have held this insufficient to show a concrete, palpable, and distinct injury. 100 Reasoning that such an attenuated injury
would infringe upon the legislative authority of Congress and the rulemaking process of the executive agencies, Scalia explained:
If the injuries hypothesized by the interest groups suing in the present
cases are sufficient, it is difficult to imagine a contemplated public benefit under any law which cannot-simply by believing in it ardently
enough-be made the basis for judicial intrusion into the business of
the political branches. What we achieve today is not judicial vindication of private rights, but judicial infringement upon the people's prerogative to have their elected representatives determine how laws that
do not bear upon private rights shall be applied.101
Apparently, in Scalia's view, the fact that many individuals share an
injury may be sufficient in itself to deny standing to those seeking judicial
review of agency action. The doctrine of standing "is an essential means
of restricting the courts to their assigned role of protecting minority
rather than majority interests." 10 2 Therefore, "not all 'concrete injury'
indirectly following from governmental action or inaction"' 10 3 would support "a congressional conferral of standing."1 4 Criticizing SCRAP's
conferral of standing on "all who breathe [the country's] air,"10 5 Scalia
argued:
ments met, id., the majority held that individual members could have sued in their own right:
there was a sufficient injury in fact because the members would not have an adequate opportunity to purchase fuel-efficient light trucks if the order was upheld. Id. at 1332-43. The fact
that many people shared in the injury was not relevant to the question of whether there was an
injury in fact, but went to the question of whether the injury was a mere "generalized grievance." Id. at 1334. The court considered the prohibition against generalized grievances a prudential consideration rather than a constitutional requirement. Id. Since the majority felt
Congress had eliminated all prudential considerations by incorporating the "adversely affected
or aggrieved by" language into the statute, the fact that many people shared in the injury was
not a barrier to suit. Id. at 1336-37.

98. 793 F.2d at 1343 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 688-89 (1973)) (emphasis added by Scalia).
99. Id. at 1343-44.
100. Id. at 1344.
101. Id. at 1342.
102. Scalia, Standing,supra note 63, at 895.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687.
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One can conceive of. . . a concrete injury so widely shared that a
congressional specification that the statute at issue was meant to preclude precisely that injury would nevertheless not suffice to mark out a
subgroup of the body politic requiring judicial protection .... There is
surely no reason to believe that an alleged governmental default of
such general impact
would not receive fair consideration in the normal
10 6
political process.
Scalia believes SCRAP illustrates how "diminutive the new APA
requirements of standing" may have become. 10 7 Such widely shared injuries should not be permissible bases for standing because
there is no reason to remove the matter from the political process and
place it in the courts. Unless the plaintiff can show some respect in
which he is harmed more than the rest of us... he has not established
any basis for concern that the majority is suppressing or ignoring the
rights of a minority that wants protection, 0 and
thus has not established
8
the prerequisite for judicial intervention.1
To redress the type of widely shared injury involved in SCRAP, Scalia
would require a challenger to plead her cause in the legislature or before
the agencies themselves.
b. Fairly Traceable Causation
The causation requirement 0 9 is the only factor in the standing analysis that Scalia interprets more liberally than the Supreme Court. To
106. Scalia, Standing,supra note 63, at 895-96.
107. Id. at 890.
108. Id. at 894-95.
109. The causation and redressability requirements first appeared as part of the article III
standing analysis in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975). The Court required plaintiffs
to "establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the defendants' actions,
or that prospective relief will remove the harm." Id. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), the Court used both the causation and redressability
requirements to dismiss a claim that the Internal Revenue Service's tax treatment of hospitals
encouraged the hospitals to deny services to indigents. Id. at 38, 41-43. Finally, in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church &State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982), the Court adopted the decisions with approval making the two requirements,
"at an irreducible minimum," part of the article III inquiry.
The Supreme Court has occasionally treated the two requirements as one. See, e.g., Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 (1978) ("The more difficult
step in the standing inquiry is establishing that these injuries 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,' . . . or put otherwise, that the exercise of the Court's remedial
powers would redress the claimed injuries." (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 41)). Nevertheless,
other cases make it clear that the factors are distinct and that both are essential to article III
standing. The causation requirement "examines the causal connection between the assertedly
unlawful conduct and the alleged injury." The redressability requirement "examines the
causal connection between the alleged injury and thejudicialreliefrequested." Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (emphasis added). The analysis of the two requirements, however, may be similar in some cases. When relief requested by the plaintiffs is "simply the
cessation of illegal conduct," the analyses are "identical." Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA,
793 F.2d 1322, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 759 n.24 (1984)). If the injury
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satisfy the causation requirement, the Supreme Court requires a showing
that the injury results from the defendant's actions and not from independent action of a third party not before the court. 11 0 In Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,"I the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim of standing, in part because causation depended upon a showing that the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) tax
regulations would encourage hospitals to stop furnishing services to indigents. The hospitals' reaction formed the basis of the plaintiffs' claims
that the IRS' actions injured them; 112 the plaintiffs failed to meet the
causation requirements.
In Block v. Meese,' '3 the plaintiff challenged government classification of foreign films as political propaganda. The government argued
that causation was not present because any harm caused by the political
propoganda classification would be due to irrational public reaction
based upon a false impression as to the meaning of the classification.
Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected this argument, saying it was relevant only to the merits of the case. In his view, the constitutional inquiry
114
requires only "de facto causality."
Scalia did not directly distinguish Simon in Block, but merely
stated that it would be impossible to maintain that there is no standing
when the defendant's action harms the plaintiff only through the reactions of third persons. 1 5 The public reaction in Block, however, is virtually indistinguishable from the hospital's reaction in Simon. In both
cases, the reaction that directly caused the injury was proximately caused
by the putatively unlawful conduct of the government. Thus, Scalia appeared to adopt a more liberal approach to causation than the Supreme
116
Court took in Simon.
c. Redressability
Scalia interprets redressability more stringently than the Supreme
Court currently requires. In Allen v. Wright, 117 Justice O'Connor's macan be traced directly to illegal conduct of the defendant, the injury is easily redressible by
court order.
110. Simon, 426 U.S. at 42.
111. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
112. Id. at 40-41.
113. 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 1309.
115. Id. Scalia cautioned that defamation and tortious interference with contract are examples of actions where standing may be maintained on the basis of third-party reactions. Id.
116. However, Scalia's standing analysis may have been a somewhat result-oriented manipulation of the causation requirement. Although he interpreted the causation requirement
fairly liberally, Scalia then decided against the plaintiffs on the merits, holding that there was
no first amendment or statutory violation in the government's labelling of Canadian environmental films about acid rain as "political propaganda." Id. at 1309-18.
117. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
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jority opinion stated that in order to meet the redressability requirement,
118
relief must be "likely" to follow from a favorable decision by the court.
Scalia would require that relief be "substantially likely" to follow from
the requested action.11 9
Scalia's application of the standard in the Centerfor Auto Safety
case is illustrative of his more stringent approach. Consider the following characterization of the events that would be necessary for the Center
for Auto Safety petitioners to receive the relief requested: A court order
compelling NHTSA to issue new standards would remedy petitioners'
alleged injury only if (1) NHTSA could thereby issue significantly higher
standards, (2) manufacturers would try to meet the new standards rather
than pay noncompliance fines, and (3) manufacturers would choose to
meet the new standards by introducing new truck models that would not
have been available
otherwise, rather than sell more of their already ex120
isting trucks.
Scalia characterized his test as a showing of substantial likelihood
that an injury will be redressable. In actuality, his application of the test
requires that petitioners show redressability is certain to follow. The
redressability requirement would be a formidable barrier if plaintiffs were
required to show that a favorable decision would, by a direct chain of
causation, achieve the desired result. Requiring proof that the relief requested would redress the injury alleged, that manufacturers would comply rather than paying fines, would have imposed an impossible burden
on the plaintiffs in Centerfor Auto Safety. If the inquiry, however, were
whether the relief requested might alleviate the injury alleged, it would
seem that, on the facts of Centerfor Auto Safety, a plaintiff need only
show that an agency could impose sanctions on the manufacturers, and
not that those sanctions would ultimately be effective.
d. The Zone of Interests Requirement
As discussed previously, only one prudential factor must be met to
establish standing under the APA: the plaintiff's claim must be arguably
2
within the zone of interests to be regulated by the statute in question.' 1
The zone of interests requirement is not meant to be particularly demanding, and there need be no indication of congressional purpose to
benefit the particular plaintiff who challenges agency action. 22 Thus,
review is denied only "if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related
to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
118. Id. at 751.
119. Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
122. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 107 S.Ct. 750, 757 (1987).
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reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit."123
The inquiry is not limited to the particular section of the statute under
124
suit; courts may look to the overall purposes of the statute as a whole.
The Supreme Court's opinion in SCRAP 125 illustrates a particularly
liberal application of the test. The Court found that anyone who used
the natural resources allegedly affected by disregard of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) could claim an injury in fact. 126 Further, it was "undisputed" that the injury alleged was within the zone of
127
interests Congress intended to protect under NEPA.
The Court's recent decision in Clarke v. SecuritiesIndustry Association 128 shows a more typical application. The Court held that a trade
association representing competitors could challenge the Comptroller of
Currency's grant of permission to certain banks to open offices offering
discount brokerage services outside their home states. 129 The Comptroller argued that the trade association was not within the zone of interests
because the section of the statute challenged was meant to establish competitive equality between state and national banks, rather than to protect
securities dealers as competitors.13 0 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that the association was within the zone of interests of the general
1 31
policy goal of the statute.
In Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 132 individual consumers
and consumer organizations challenged several milk marketing orders issued by the Secretary of Agriculture because the orders raised the costs
for milk handlers and producers, resulting in higher milk prices. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted standing to these
consumers, in part because the general policy section of the statute in
question expressed a goal of protecting consumers from unreasonable
price fluctuations, thus bringing the challengers within the zone of interests of the statute. 133 That the injury was shared by many consumers
123. Id.
124. Id. at 756, 758.
125. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973).
126. Id. at 689-90.
127. Id. at 686 n.13.
128. 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
129. Id. at 754.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 759. Scalia did not participate in the Clarke decision since he was a member of
the D.C. Circuit panel which heard the case. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied en banc, 765 F.2d 1196 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). Scalia, dissenting from the denial of rehearing, would have accepted the Comptroller's argument regarding the zone of interests test. See 765 F.2d at 1197 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 1249-50.
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13 4
was insufficient to defeat standing according to the majority.
Scalia, dissenting in Community Nutrition Institute, dismissed the
references to consumer interests in the general purpose section of the act
as "if not.. . 'pious platitudes,' then at least no more than a recital of the
ultimate purpose of the statutory scheme which has no real bearing upon

who was expected to enforce

'

it." 135

The consumers were only the "indi-

rect general beneficiaries" of the regulation. Since direct beneficiaries,
the milk handlers and producers, were readily identifiable; the consumers had no standing.136
In Scalia's view, the zone of interests requirement is meant to determine whether Congress intended a plaintiff to act as a "private attorney
general" in challenging agency action. 137 The broader the zone within
which plaintiff claims his interests lie, the weaker the indication of such
intent becomes, especially when there is a direct and immediate beneficiary who could be relied upon to challenge the agency's disregard of the
38
law.'
Scalia's argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding
in SCRAP, where anyone who used the affected resources was within the
zone of interests of NEPA.139 Scalia sought to distinguish SCRAP, however, by saying that a different case is presented "when a statutory provision benefits generalized interests through the protection of more
particularizedinterests to which it is immediately directed."140 When a
direct beneficiary class could be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the law, "the claim of the indirect general beneficiaries to be con4
gressionally designated 'private attorneys general' is weak indeed."' '
C. Summary
It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will return to a legal
wrong test for standing. In Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 142
the Court summarized the lower court's opinion in Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 14 3 which had essentially applied the legal interest analysis and reaffirmed its rejection of that analysis and its adoption of the injury in fact-zone of interests test for standing
134. Id. at 1251.
135. Id. at 1258 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 1257.
137. Id. at 1256.
138. Id. at 1256-57.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
140. Community Nutrition Inst., 698 F.2d at 1256-57 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
141. Id. at 1257.
142. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n., 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987).
143. 397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

under the APA.144 However, the Court has retreated somewhat from its
original liberal injury in fact analysis by adding the redressability and
145
causation requirements.

The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended to allow
broader standing under the A.PA. 146 Yet Scalia's analysis of injury in
fact and redressibility is much narrower than the Court's recent decisions
seem to require. He believes only a very particularized injury shared by a
few affected individuals supports standing. 147 Furthermore, under his
view of the redressibility requirement, it is insufficient to show that judicial relief is available that is likely to remedy the injury. The plaintiff
must show a chain of cause and effect making it substantially likely that
148
judicial relief will redress the injury.
Scalia has acknowledged that he would manipulate the standing
doctrine to preserve separation of powers. In his 1983 article on stand-

ing, Scalia recognized that it is unlikely that the APA's judicial review
provision would be restored to its original meaning. He perceived, however, a favorable swing in philosophy by the current Court showing an
apparent movement toward more restrictive standing.' 49 Commenting
that. the Supreme Court's "zone of interests" formulation "leaves plenty
of room for maneuvering," Scalia stated that he expected that maneuvering to be in the direction of separation of powers.' 50
Scalia has also described the doctrine of standing as "a crucial and
inseparable element of [the principle of separation of powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce ...an overjudicialization of the processes
144. 107 S. Ct. at 755-56.
145. See supra note 109 for a discussion of the Court's adoption of the redressability and
causation requirements; see also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1256
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that application
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.,
of the zone of interests test differs in non-APA cases and may be somewhat stricter because
"[t]he Supreme Court's most recent recitation of the 'arguably within the zone of interests'
formula in a non-A!PA case omits the word 'arguably.' "), rev'd, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
146. See supra notes 56 & 61 and accompanying text. The "adversely affected or aggrieved" language in APA section 702 was always interpreted as showing a congressional intent to broaden the class of claimants capable of challenging agency action. See, eg., FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940) (construing a similar provision in the
Communications Act of 1934, chap. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (Supp. 11 1984))); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736-38 (1972). In
Data Processing Service, the Court extended this construction of the "adversely affected or
aggrieved" language to section 702 as a whole, construing the "generous review provisions" of
the APA as a broad grant of statutory standing which enlarges the class of people who can
protest administrative action. 397 U.S. at 156 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48,
51 (1955)); see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text for discussion of Scalia's criticism of
this expansion.
147. See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
149. Scalia, Standing, supra note 63, at 891.
150. Id. at 899.
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of self-governance." 151 His view that widely shared injuries should not
support standing is consistent with separation of powers, since he believes that widely shared injuries are capable of resolution through the
political branches and before the agencies themselves.1 52 The validity of
this majoritarian, separation of powers premise in the context of standing
to challenge agency action is discussed in the final section of this Note.

Along with his willingness to use the standing doctrine as a tool for
protecting political discretion, Scalia has similarly adopted a deferential
153
approach towards judicial review of rulemaking proceedings.

The next section discusses Scalia's interpretation of the scope of judicial review of rulemaking proceedings as an additional means of protecting political discretion once a claimant gains access to the federal
courts.

IIM.

Scope of Review

The APA requires agencies to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking."' 154 The courts are obligated to ensure that the agencies have adequately met this requirement. The standard of review for informal
rulemakings, set out in APA section 706(2)(A), requires that the courts
determine whether an agency rulemaking is "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law ...,,155 The
151. Id. at 881; see also Fein, High Court Upheaval,supra note 6, at 14, col. 3 ("Scalia is
likely to be scrupulous in seeking to limit judicial authority to resolving concrete disputes
properly within the judicial universe.").
152. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
154. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
104 (1983).
155. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). Section 706 provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The
reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determina-
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nature of this obligation, however, is not completely clear and much depends on how narrowly or broadly a reviewing court interprets the standard of review. The following sections present the two standards of
review adopted by the courts and demonstrate that Scalia would apply an
extremely deferential interpretation of the standard of review, consistent
with his theory that the element of political discretion in rulemaking
should not be subject to judicial review. 156
Standards of Review: The "Hard Look" and "Rational Connection"
Doctrines
Although on its face it appears deferential, the arbitrary and capricious standard of APA section 706(2)(A) is susceptible to varying interpretations. A broad interpretation gives the court greater latitude to
scrutinize agency action closely; a narrower interpretation forces the reviewing court into a position of greater deference. Thus, some cases have
interpreted the standard broadly as requiring a more vigorous review to
ensure that the agency has taken a "hard look" at all the factual and
policy issues underlying a particular rule. 157 Other cases have narrowly
beinterpreted the standard as requiring merely a "rational connection"
158
tween the agency's findings and the promulgated regulation.
To facilitate discussion, this Note treats these two interpretations of
the standard of review as distinct doctrines. It should be noted, however,
that these two approaches are actually shades on a spectrum rather than
isolated standards. The Supreme Court has not made a clear distinction
between the two approaches and therefore neither is a truly separate
"test" adopted in one case or another. The Court's decision in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturer'sAssociation v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 159 which applied a "hard look" scrutiny, also required articA.

tions, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a
party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard applies to informal rulemaking. Two of the
other five standards, the substantial evidence standard and de novo factual review, have limited applicability in essentially formal rather than informal proceedings. Section 706(2)(E) sets
out the substantial evidence test which is authorized only when the agency action is taken
pursuant to an adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 554, or a rulemaking provision required to be
made "on the record" under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). Note, JudicialReview ofInformalAdministrative Rulemaking, 1984 DUKE L. J. 347, 350 (1982). As the Supreme Court stated in Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), section 706(2)(F) applies only
"when the action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding procedures are inadequate... [or] when issues that were not before the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce
nonadjudicatory agency action." Id. at 415. The other three standards set out the basic constitutional, statutory, and procedural boundaries controlling agency action. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 706(2)(B),(C),(D) (1982).
156. Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 12, at v.
157. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
159. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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ulation of a rational connection. 160 Yet the Court's decision one week
earlier in Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 161 which did at least mention the hard look doctrine, only
required articulation of a rational connection.' 62 On the surface, the
standards appear to be distinguishable only through a semantic word
game. There is a difference, however, in the degree of scrutiny to which
the reviewing court subjects an agency decision, a difference which has
significant impact on the scope of review of deregulatory action.
(1)

The "HardLook" Doctrine

The "hard look" or "adequate consideration" doctrine is used to
examine the factual basis of rules to ensure compliance with the arbitrary
and capricious standard. Generally, it requires the agency to provide an
evidentiary record reflecting the basis for its decision, to explain its reasoning in detail, and to give adequate consideration to the evidence submitted during the rulemaking proceeding.1 63 A court does not consider
policy issues de novo, substituting its judgment for that of the agency.
Instead, a court subjects the agency decision to an extensive evaluation to
6
determine whether the agency has exercised reasoned discretion.' 4
To satisfy the standard, a court must determine "whether there has
been a clear error of judgment" and "whether the decision was based on
a consideration of the relevant factors."' 65 In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
160. Id. at 43.
161. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
162. Id. at 105.
163. S.BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 48, at 341-42. See Sunstein, Deregulationand
the Hard-LookDoctrine, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv.177, 181-84, for detailed discussion of the hardlook doctrine's requirements.
The hard look doctrine first developed from a series of District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals decisions. See, eg., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (courts must intervene where "the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at
the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making." (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979) ; Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckelshaus, 486
F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[the] agency.. . has a continuing duty to take a 'hard
look.' "), cert denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). The Supreme Court provided implicit support for
a hard look approach to review of an informal adjudication in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). As interpreted by the Court in Overton Park,
although application of the arbitrary and capricious standard "is to be searching and careful
...the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency." Id. at 416. Thus, the Secretary of Transportation's
decision, as reviewed by the Court in Overton Park, was "entitled to a presumption of regularity..., but [this] presumption was not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, in-depth
review." Id. at 415; see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only
role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look.' ").
164. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'don othergrounds, 463
U.S. 680 (1983).
165. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
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Co.,166 the Court clarified what would constitute consideration of relevant factors:
[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
be
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not 167
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
In State Farm, the Court indicated that an agency decision cannot be
upheld where there are no findings or analysis to justify the choice made
and no indication of the basis on which the agency exercised its discrecogently explain why
tion. Justice White explained that "an agency must168
it has exercised its discretion in a given manner."
The hard look doctrine can be criticized because judges arguably
may lack the expertise necessary to understand a highly technical agency
decision.169 One commentator has argued even that the hard look approach undermines the legitimacy of administrative decisions:
[l]itigation plays an ever more critical role in the regulatory process, as
agencies must defend all major regulatory actions in the judicial arena.
Intrusive and extensive judicial supervision of administrative decisionimaking increases the vulnerability of agency rules, and the legitimacy
their regulations become
of federal agencies inexorably wanes when
170
contingent on the judicial imprimatur.
For the hard look approach to be effective, the agencies must create
a "reviewable" record, containing" 'a thorough ventilation of the [scientific and normative] issues' so that judges themselves may scrutinize and
assess the rationality of administrative decisions." 17 1 This so-called
judicialization of the administative process arguably contributes to inordinate delay and inefficiency in the regulatory process. 172 In addition,
the Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NaturalResourcesDefense Council,Inc., which clearly stated that courts
may not impose extra procedural requirements not mandated by the
166. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
167. Id. at 43.
168. Id. at 48.
169. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). The D.C. Circuit opinion covers over 100 pages and contains
detailed diagrams, tables and graphs used by the Court to take a "hard-look" at the reasonableness of emissions standards promulgated by the EPA. The opinion itself states that "the
volume and technical complexity of the material" necessary for review was "daunting." Id. at
314.
170. O'Brien, Marbury, The APA, and Science-Policy Disputes: The Alluring and Elusive
Judicial/AdministrativePartnership,7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 443, 473 (1984).
171. Id. at 472 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 964 (1978)).
172. See id. at 473.
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APA, makes it doubtful that a reviewing court can impose an evidentiary
record requirement on the agencies without congressional
173
authorization.
(2) The "Rational Connection" Test
The rational connection doctrine is a more deferential approach to
review of an agency decision than the hard look doctrine. The State
Farm dissent, written by Justice Rehnquist, for Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and O'Connor, embodies the rational connection doctrine. Although the majority concluded that the agency had acted arbitrarily, Justice Rehnquist believed the agency's explanation of its result
should be treated with greater deference. 174 In his view, the agency decision articulated a rational connection and should have been upheld. 175
Similarly, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,176 reasoned that the
"only task [was] to determine whether the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission ha[d] considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 177 In that
case, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had issued a rule requiring licensing boards to assume, for licensing purposes, that the permanent storage of nuclear wastes by power plants would have no
significant environmental impact.178 Over the objections of a dissenting
judge who accused the majority of taking "too hard a look," 179 the court
of appeals concluded that the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious because the NRC had failed to factor in uncertainties surrounding
its assumption and had not allowed those uncertainties to affect individual licensing decisions.1 80 The Supreme Court reversed unanimously,
treating the agency assumption as a policy judgment and finding that the
NRC had articulated a rational connection. The Court stated that review must be most deferential when an agency is making predictions
within its special area of expertise. 81
On the surface, O'Connor appeared to apply the same "hard look"
173. 435 U.S. 519, 524, 54548 (1978); see supra note 23.
174. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 58 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
176. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
177. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 89-90.
179. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
180. Id. at 477.
181. Baltimore, 462. U.S. at 105-06. The Court determined that the rule was adopted for
the limited purpose of licensing decisions and not to evaluate or select the most effective longterm method of waste disposal. Id. at 101-02. Also, the Court felt that, when considered in
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approach used by the State Farm majority since she clearly stated that
the court must determine whether the agency had considered all the factors. Actually, her approach was much more deferential. The majority
in State Farm required the agency to examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection. 182 By characterizing the agency's assumption as a policy judgment
and requiring only articulation of a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made, the Court in Baltimore Gas and Electric applied a more deferential approach than it later adopted in State Farm.
B. Scalia's Interpretation of the Standard of Review
Scalia has criticized the imposition of the hard look doctrine on
agency decisionmaking. In KCST-TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission,18 3 the agency denied an application for a waiver from the
significantly viewed exception to the nonduplication rule. A majority of
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the order,
stating that the agency was required to take a "hard look at meritorious
applications for waiver and [to] consider all relevant factors."' 18 4 In dissent, Scalia argued against the majority's hard look approach, describing
it as "the type of 'fine-tuning'... contributing to regulatory delay and to
18 5
the increasing caseload of the courts."'
Even when an agency has made a major departure from prior decisions, as is often the case with rulemakings having deregulatory effects,
Scalia views "overall rational support" as sufficient to uphold the
agency's decision.18 6 Thus, Scalia would refuse to reverse "simply because there are uncertainties, analytic imperfections, or even mistakes in
the pieces of the picture petitioners have chosen to bring to [the court's]
attention."' 8 7 In Centerfor Auto Safety v. Peck,18 the petitioners challenged as arbitrary and capricious a rulemaking procedure involving the
relaxation of automobile bumper standards. The petitioners argued that
because the agency had reversed a longstanding policy, the court must
scrutinize more carefully the agency decision.' 8 9 Relying on the
Supreme Court's opinion in State Farm, Scalia wrote:
The Supreme Court has made clear that "the same test" applies to the
context, the NRC had compensated for the uncertainties of the assumption in other parts of
the rule. Id. at 103-04.
182. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
183. 699 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
184. Id.at 1191.
185. Id.at 1195 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
187. Id.
188. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
189. Id. at 1342-43.
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rescission or modification of a rule as to its initial promulgation-the
"arbitrary or capricious" standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982)and that there is "no difference in the scope of judicial review depending upon the nature of the agency's action." The same "presumption
• . . against changes in current policy that are not justified by the

rulemaking record," exists whether those changes consist of enacting a
new rule or of revoking or modifying an old one. 190
Scalia went on to uphold the agency's decision under a rational connection analysis, rather than giving the close scrutiny that seems to be required under State Farm.19 1
Judge Skelly Wright's dissent in Center for Auto Safety viewed
Scalia's majority opinion as "an unacceptable retreat from our judicial
responsibility to carefully review agency decisionmaking and an unsupportable condonation of agency failure to act in accordance with explicit
instructions from the legislative branch." 192 Judge Wright embraces the
hard look doctrine. In his view, even when an agency is operating in a
field of its expertise, review under the arbitrary and capricious standard,
though narrow, "is not merely perfunctory"; the Court should "engage
in a 'searching and careful' inquiry, the keystone of which is to ensure
that the [agency] engaged in reasoned decisionmaking." 193
C. Summary
The hard look doctrine involves an element of rationality-the
agency must have demonstrated a reasonable connection between the
facts on the record and the resulting policy choice.1 94 The reviewing
court's analysis, however, is more extensive than it would be if the court
is looking only for articulation of a rational connection in the agency's
explanation of its action.
Although abusive application of the hard look approach might in
some cases involve judicial "fine-tuning," resulting in "too hard a look,"
the rational connection test is subject to the criticism that it is overly
deferential. It tends to reduce judicial review of agency action to a
merely perfunctory procedure. In an era of deregulation, such perfunctory review arguably is dangerous since radical and potentially arbitrary
departures from prior policy will likely go undetected. Judicial review of
agency action is intended to be deferential, but as an earlier statement of
the Supreme Court warns, "'[t]he deference owed to an expert tribunal
190. Id. at 1343 (citations omitted).
191. Id.at 1370.
192. Id.at 1371 (Wright, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1373 (Wright, J.,
dissenting) (quoting International Ladies' Garment Workers
Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984)).
194. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds,463
U.S. 680 (1983).
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cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia.' "195
The next section explores some of the difficulties presented by
Scalia's political view of the rulemaking process and examines the potential effect of his restrictive views on standing and his deferential interpretation of the scope of review.
IV.

Impact in an Era of Deregulation
96
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 1

As shown in sections II and III, Scalia favors highly deferential judicial review of agency action with more limited access to the federal
courts. In part, this stance may be motivated by a concern that less deferential review transfers executive branch authority to the federal courts,
dominated by liberal Democrats, who may be unsympathetic to deregulatory policy. 197 These liberal Democrats are the 250 federal judges appointed by former President Carter and, as Scalia points out, a "Reagan
Supreme Court" would be able to review only a small portion of these
cases. 198 This section explores some of the difficulties presented by this
intensely political view of the rulemaking process.
Scalia's deferential approach to deregulation is somewhat puzzling
in light of his reputedly strong commitment to judicial restraint.199 On
the surface, a deferential approach seems entirely consistent with a
restraintist attitude toward judicial review. Scalia's deference, however,
can be shown to be nothing more than an activist attempt to protect the
agencies now that they are tending toward deregulation. In a 1981 article entitled Regulatory Reform-The Game Has Changed,20° Scalia
noted with disfavor the lack of awareness among conservatives in Congress that the people heading up the agencies were now committed to the
same deregulatory goals. He criticized continued proposals for heightened judicial review of agency action that actually impeded the progress
of deregulation:
195. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272
(1968) (quoting American Shipbuilding Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)); see also
Bureau of Alchohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 97
(1983) ("while reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions ...
they must not 'rubber stamp ... administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a
statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.' ") (citing
NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) and quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278,
291-92 (1965)).
196. But who is to guard the guards themselves? VI Juvenal, Satires 1.347.
197. Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 7, at 13.
198. Id. at 13-14.
199. See, e.g., Barnes, Reagan's Hopesfor High Court:Rehnquist Could Be the Answer to
Burger "Mistake,' San Francisco Chron., July 2, 1986, at C3, col. 4 ("Scalia's adherence to
conservatism and judicial restraint isn't open to much doubt.").
200. Scalia, Regulatory Reform, supra note 7, at 13.
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[a]t a time when the GOP has gained control of the executive branch
with an evident mandate for fundamental change in domestic policies,
Republicans, and deregulators in general, seem to be delighting in the
prospect of legislation which will make change more difficult. Those in
the Congress seem perversely unaware that the accursed "unelected
officials" downtown are now their unelected officials, presumably seeking to move things in their desired direction; and that every curtailment of desirable agency discretion obstructs 201
...departure from a
Democrat-produced, pro-regulatory status quo.
In light of this statement and those regarding limiting review of deregulation by Carter-appointed judges, Scalia's advocacy of deferential court
review of agency deregulation could be construed as "one-way" judicial
activism rather than judicial restraint.
Scalia's activism may be best understood in light of the problems
associated with intervention by courts in the administrative process. One
such problem has been described by Professor Charles Koch as "the inherent myopia of judicial decisionmaking. ' ' 20 2 Since judges naturally focus on the controversy at hand and the best interests of the citizen
seeking review in a particular case, judges are prevented "from reconciling the many public values and interests represented by [an agency's]
20 3
program."
Moreover, reviewing judges may lack the technical expertise necessary to perform the type of hard look review required in cases like Sierra
Club v. Costle. 20 4 There may also be problems of nonacquiescence by
agencies or agency action controlled by the "threat" of judicial review:
[w]hen a court enters the fray of overseeing agency discretion, the policy choices the court makes will be much more difficult to anticipate,
and the agency's anticipation of the political discretion of the President
or Congress becomes less useful. The policy administrator, fearful of
reversal, will narrow his or her policy options when the court assumes
this policy oversight role. 20 5 Thus, Scalia is not alone among the com20 6
mentators calling for decreased judicial review of agency action.
The alternate argument in favor ofjudicial review, was presented by
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton:
the pressures on agencies for favorable action one way or the other are
enormous. The suggestion that Congress can stop action which is un201. Id.
202. Koch, Confining JudicialAuthority Over Administrative Action, 49 Mo. L. REV. 183,

185 (1984).
203. Id.
204. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); see supra
notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
205. O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 518.
206. See O'Brien, supra note 170, at 447 ("[C]ontemporary judicial oversight of the administrative process, largely due to litigation over health, safety and environment regulation,
has rendered the APA anachronistic, with pernicious rather than auspicious consequences for
regulatory politics.").

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

desirable is true in theory; yet even Congress is too remote to give
meaningful direction and its machinery is too ponderous to use very
often. The federal agencies of which I speak are not venal or corrupt.
But they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who
manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the agency
which in time
20 7
develops between the regulator and the regulated.
In addition to this natural affinity which Douglas mentions, many members of the agencies are recruited from the industries they are supposed
to regulate. This recruitment puts agency impartiality in doubt: a
two-year congressional investigation of nine regulatory agencies between
1975 and 1976 indicated that agency commitment to interests of regulated industries took precedence over commitment to the public
20 8
interest.
In addition to the federal courts' intervention in the administrative
process, the courts' review of Presidential intervention will also have an
impact on agency action. Presidential intervention in the administrative
process has increased during this era of deregulation, particularly
through President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, which provides for
direct input and oversight from the Office of Management and Budget
and mandates cost-benefit analysis for new major regulations. 20 9 This
presidential input is not necessarily "evil" in a government organized
around separation of powers principles. The President and Vice President are elected to positions in the executive branch whereas agency personnel are not directly accountable to the public. There is a danger,
however, that presidential intervention will cause agency heads, often
appointed by the same administration, to give inordinate weight to factors favoring deregulation which are contrary to congressional intent.
Given that Scalia is described as "a forceful proponent of strong presidential powers, ' 210 he is unlikely to disapprove of this executive interven2 11
tion in the rulemaking process.
Scalia has frequently emphasized that separation of powers principles underlie his interpretation of standing and the role of the courts in
the administrative process generally. 2 12 This reliance on separation of
powers can be criticized on several grounds. First, reliance on separation
of powers is criticized where "mere incantation of that phrase" is substituted for an analysis of the difficult questions posed by the facts of a
207.

405 U.S. 727, 745-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

208. R. DICLERICO, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT 118 (2d ed. 1983).
209. See Exec. Order No. 12, 291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 431-34 (1982).
210. Fein, High Court Upheavals, supra note 6, at 14, col. 3.
211. But see Scalia, Reagulation-The First Year, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 19
(questioning the effectiveness of the executive order in achieving regulatory reform).
212. See supra notes 71, 149-52 and accompanying text.
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case.2 13 By simply citing separation of powers as a reason to deny standing, the reviewing court ignores the question of whether an actual, concrete injury in fact should support standing to sue.
Second, Scalia's separation of powers argument is inconsistent with
the intent of section 702 of APA. Although section 702 was enacted to
codify existing laws on standing, the legislative history of the APA recognized the judiciary's continuing role in determining who could seek review of agency action. 2 14 The Supreme Court now interprets section 702
as a broad congressional conferral of standing. Scalia's narrower construction would make statutory review available only where substantive
statutes provide for it. Notwithstanding his interpretation, a broader
conferral of standing is constitutional as long as Congress does not remove the essential constitutional requirement of injury in fact.21 5 The
Supreme Court's present construction, therefore, remains consistent with
separation of powers because it still involves a congressional grant of
more generous standing.
A third criticism of Scalia's argument ,is that separation of powers
analysis should not be used to deny standing where Congress has given
the courts power of review, thereby consenting, within constitutional
bounds, to some encroachment by the courts. Rather, separation of powers principles are appropriately used to ensure that each of the three
coequal branches of government does not encroach too far into the activities of the others.
Finally, Scalia's separation of powers argument ignores the courts'
essential function as a check on the actions of the other two branches.
The increased executive branch intervention in the process authorized by
Executive Order 12,291 supports an argument for increased judicial review of agency action to maintain the coequal status of the three
branches of government. Since rulemaking is an essentially legislative
function, congressional intent should control whether deregulation is undertaken. Courts must preserve legislative intent by determining not only
whether all relevant factors have been considered but also whether any
improper factors have been considered. 21 6 Executive intervention must
be subject to effective judicial review to ensure that the agencies do not
give undue weight to one of the political branches while ignoring the
instructions of the other.
There has been no indication in recent cases that any other Justice
on the Supreme Court favors a return to the amorphous "legal wrong"
213. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for focusing on separation of powers "as if the mere incantation of that phrase
provide[d] an obvious solution to the difficult questions presented").
214. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 426 U.S. 29,

43, 48 (1983).
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test. In fact, the Court recently reaffirmed its injury in fact-zone of
interests formulation in Clarke'v. Securities Industry Association.2 17
Scalia will seemingly therefore be forced to settle for the "maneuverability" provided by the Court's current bifurcated standard, even though he
disagrees with the test in theory. Under Scalia's restrictive approach of
the present standing test, an injury shared by many would be redressible
only through the political branches. If injury in fact can be established, a
plaintiff's attempt to meet the redressability requirement would be defeated if there was any likelihood that the relief granted would be ineffective for whatever reason.
The decreased access resulting from his restrictive interpretation is
consistent with Scalia's view of the ideal rulemaking process. According
to Scalia, the rulemaking process should be essentially political, taking
into account the "manifestations of the popular will through the political
process" by those groups with the political power necessary to make
their voices heard. 2 18 Persons seeking relief from agency action directly
through the political process, however, are required either to wait for the
next presidential election and hope for change or to solicit aid from Congress. The latter route, in order to be effective, requires the help of a wellfinanced and well-organized political action group. Arguably, this is appropriate where the person seeking relief has suffered no direct harm.
Mere dissatisfaction with government is insufficient to justify judicial intervention. Yet where a plaintiff suffers an actual injury from allegedly
unlawful agency action, access to judicial relief should not be denied.
The result of increased access to the courts under a more liberal
standing doctrine, even under a less deferential "hard look" approach,
need not be replacement of the agency's judgment with that of a judge
sitting in an "isolated think-tank. '2 19 Courts need not inquire into the
wisdom of deregulation. Applied properly, the "hard look" approach
merely ensures that the agencies have taken a closer look at all the relevant factors affecting a decision to rescind or relax regulations which
earlier agency action has deemed necessary.
Without effective review, there is a danger that "important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress," may be "lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy. ' 220 Scalia
apparently feels that as long as no minority interests are affected, this
result is acceptable:
[w]here no peculiar harm to particular individuals or minorities is in
question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere. Yesterday's herald is today's
217. 107 S. Ct. 750, 755-56 (1987).
218. Scalia, Rulemaking, supra note 12, at vi.
219. Id.
220. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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of our chambers, may not
bore-although we judges, in the seclusion
22 1
be au courant enough to realize it.
Yet one factor that prompted passage of the APA in 1946 was the
concern that agencies acted as a "headless fourth branch of government. '222 A primary impetus for reform
was the perceived need for ef22 3
fective judicial review of agency action.
Under the approach adopted by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia, this "effective" review is reduced from a
"hard look" to a "rational connection." Their perfunctory approach
goes beyond the deference originally required by the A-PA and leaves the
agencies too free to deregulate without consideration of the legislative
purposes underlying the health, safety, and environmental legislation of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. If important legislative purposes are to be
lost in the federal bureaucracy through deregulatory agency action, they
should only be lost after consideration of all relevant factors. When mere
rationality takes the place of close scrutiny, and plaintiffs suffering actual
injury are prevented from reaching the courts to complain of arbitrary
action, the result is not protection of political discretion but rather abdication of judicial responsibility.

Conclusion
The appointment of Antonin Scalia to the United States Supreme
Court is likely to have a significant effect on the development of administrative law. Justice Scalia's approach to standing and scope of review
will further insulate agency action from substantive judicial review.
Barriers to access to the courts, like Scalia's interpretation of the
redressability factor, will have the effect of once again using "'standing
to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full
221. Scalia, Standing, supra note 63, at 897.
222. K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 4, § 1.7, at 21. The statement was made in a 1937
report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management. The report also described agencies as "a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers."
Id. at 21-22 (quoting the President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report No.
39-40 (1937)).
223. In 1933, the American Bar Association created a Special Committee on Administrative Law, partly in response to New Deal legislation which had resulted in an extension of
administrative powers. The Special Committee "served not only as a continuing agency for
observation and criticism, but also as the mainspring of the persistent efforts towards improvement which at last came to fruit in the Administrative Procedure Act." Dickinson, AdministrativeProcedureAct: Scope and Grounds of BroadenedJudicialReview, 33 A.B.A. J. 434,43435 (1947). The Committee was primarily concerned with the undermining of the judiciary
through delegation of judicial functions to executive and legislative agencies. K. DAVIS,
TREATISE, supra note 4, § 1.7, at 21 (citing 59 A.B.A. R. 539, 549 (1934)). Administrative
judges with "insecure" tenure of office handed down decisions the ABA felt were not subject to
effective judicial review. Id. (citing 61 A.B.A. R. 720 (1936)).
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consideration of their claims on the merits.' ",224 This test for standing
creates too great a barrier for proponents of regulation to challenge allegedly arbitrary agency action in court. The test seems unwarranted given
the broadened class of plaintiffs allowed to sue under the APA.
Scalia's interpretation of the scope of judicial review of agency action is overly deferential, providing for almost no review of deregulation
once a plaintiff gains access to the courts. The effective judicial review
that the APA's supporters called for becomes a formality under his approach. The court's role becomes that of a perfunctory "rubber stamp"
on agency action so long as a rational connection can be made.
The courts' role in the administrative process is properly a limited
one and judges must be relied upon to exercise self-restraint. It is true
that the doctrine of standing can be used as a means of protecting political discretion. As Justice Powell stated in Warth v. Seldin,225 the standing doctrine "is founded in concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society. '226 The narrow and
deferential scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
can be used for the same purpose. At some point, however, an overly
restrictive view of standing and an overly perfunctory scope of review
result not in self-restraint but in abdication of judicial responsibility.
This abdication of judicial responsibility cannot be justified simply
by incantation of the phrase "separation of powers" 227 or deference to
"some element of . . . political discretion, not reviewable by the
courts. '2 28 In an era of regulation, the agencies serve as guards appointed by Congress to protect society against perceived social ills. In
this era of deregulation, the courts must be capable of effectively reviewing the actions of the guards so that legislative purposes are not lost to
arbitrary decisionmaking.
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